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Green is in. The European Commission, that infamously undemocratic executive arm of the 
European Union has made the European Green Deal its flagship policy, which comes at the 
back of a renewed commitment to ‘social Europe’ with the inauguration of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights in 2017. Most recently, Chantal Mouffe has urged the Left to rally 
around a Green democratic transformation, along the lines of the Green New Deal policy 
project advanced by the radical wing of the US Democratic party. This indicates the 
emergence of a broad societal consensus for an epochal paradigm shift, akin to the shifts 
that enabled the post-WWII welfare state and that of neoliberal capitalism in the late 20th 
century.   
 
Undoing the neoliberal hegemony  
The anti-establishment insurgencies (aka ‘populism’) in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis 
did not uproot neoliberal capitalism, but they dealt a blow to its hegemony by lifting the veil 
of apparent inevitability that had covered the policy commitments to free markets and open 
economies over the past four decades. Efforts to cope with the coronavirus pandemic made 
significant reversals to the ‘profits over people’ policy logic. This has opened what Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have called a “space of indeterminacy” – the possibility for 
change without a preset direction. 
As we stand in this nascent space of indeterminacy, we are facing a historical tipping 
point. Progressive politics could be reactivated through the synergy between social and 
environmental justice. In Mouffe’s vision, such a synergy would be able to fire up hearts and 
minds, prompting a leftist overhaul of the anti-establishment rebellions. Left populism, thus 
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recast, would finally be able to eclipse the xenophobic, exclusionary right-wing populism, 
and offer a constructive alternative to neoliberal capitalism.  
The logic of such a transformation engages two conceptual moves, detailed in 
Mouffe’s For a Left Populism (2019). First, the Left must construct a ‘common will’ by 
drawing a frontier between, on the one hand, the various losers of the neoliberal 
configuration of global capitalism and, on the other, the elites who promote that model and 
profit from it. These fault-lines, Mouffe rightly observes, do not align with the capital-labour 
divide as grievances of oppression surpass those of exploitation. In this sense she advocates 
a ‘populist’ (a broadly democratic) rather than a class-based mode of mobilisation.  Second, 
in its struggle for justice, the heterogenous people should be animated politically by a 
commitment to radical democracy. The radicalization of democracy consists in the 
“extension of the democratic principles of liberty and equality to a wider set of social 
relations” (ibid, 28); social justice is therefore to be obtained by fighting all inequalities – 
economic, political and cultural. To the fight for liberty and equality is added the struggle for 
environmental justice.  
 As Mouffe notes, such a recasting of the Left project in terms of radical and plural 
democracy, rather than Socialism, is in tune with prevailing visions of justice: “It is no doubt 
significant that the main targets of the ‘movement of the squares’ were the shortcomings of 
the political system and of the democratic institutions and that they did not call for 
‘socialism’ but for a ‘real democracy’” (ibid. 41). Democracy, rather than Socialism, is the 
proper banner of the struggle against oppression in our century, she claims.  
This formula of progressive politics is both ambitious and realistic -- it captures well 
the climate of our era. Yet, I will address some tensions between the ambitions of this 
strategy and its realism, in order to bring to the fore overlooked components of progressive 
politics which are indispensable for achieving the desired synergy between social and 
environmental justice. Finally, I will advance a bit further on the path articulated by Mouffe 
and will suggest that the proper Left alternative to the class struggle is not that of a Left 
populism understood as radicalization of democracy, but subverting capitalism by mobilizing 
an even wider and more diverse anti-capitalist front.   
 
The three stumbling stones of progressive politics 
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1/ The great Green deal and its little Red social problem  
Bridging environmental and social justice is undoubtfully a worthy cause. But this cannot 
happen by pledging, as most self-identified ‘progressive’ political formations now do, a 
parallel commitment to environmental preservation and economic equality. The struggles 
for ecological and social justice have not only taken place on separate battlefields, they have 
been in conflict with each other. Advocates for a grand Green transition have always had a 
little ’red’ problem. In the famous words of one Yellow Vest protester: “The elites talk about 
the end of the world; we talk about the end of the month”. There are solid reasons why 
social and ecological justice have been political ‘frenemies’. The political economy of 
neoliberal capitalism has made livelihoods strongly dependent on employment in polluting 
industries, and consumers’ purchasing power has been dependent on cheap imports. This 
has engendered a powerful capital-labour alliance that has been opposing environmental 
policy ever since ecological concerns gained public attention in the 1970s. Reassurances that 
the Green transition would create in the future more jobs than it will eliminate are not 
compelling when livelihoods are at stake now. We cannot expect working people to be 
impassioned about a Green transition when their livelihoods – here and now – are 
threatened by such a transition. 
 
2/ Fighting inequality as a neoliberal fallacy 
The second weakness of the Green democratic transformation project is its narrow 
understanding of social justice in terms of fighting inequalities. Since pundits and academics 
drew public attention to the spectacular growth of inequalities in the West, social justice 
has been approached as a matter of fighting inequality via wealth redistribution. Although 
this is often presented as a radical opposition to neoliberal capitalism, the departure from 
neoliberal convention is only apparent. Thinking in terms of inequality engages a logic of 
comparison between individuals and presents the idea of social justice in individualistic 
terms – as a matter of personal circumstances, of private wealth. Such focus on individual 
circumstances is a trademark of the neoliberal mentality. Thus, even as we engage in the 
worthy struggle against inequality and exclusion, we in fact remain captive of the neoliberal 
imaginary, which views society as composed by individuals in charge of their lives. This 
eliminates the notion of collective wellbeing that has always been fundamental for Socialism 
as it espoused a solidaristic economy without emphasizing neither equality nor prosperity. 
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(It might be worth remembering that Marx did not advocate economic equality in his vision 
of a just social order and that the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe created societies 
that were egalitarian but not solidaristic). A privately wealthy society, even if fairly equal, 
can still be publicly poor if essential public services are missing or deficient of funds 
(something that John Galbraith observed back in 1958). 
Typically, pledges to fighting inequality invoke the policy formula of growth-and-
redistribution that had ensured the (relative) equality and prosperity of the post-WWII 
welfare state. However, this prosperity – obtained via intensified production and 
consumption -- proved toxic for the environment. That is why it is implausible to promise 
both meaningful action on the Green transition and ‘unprecedented prosperity’-- as the 
Green New Deal vouches. We should not count on working people’s credulity to ‘buy’ facile 
political promises for prosperity and ecological action. Even when people are ideologically 
misguided, they are not stupid – and it is a grave political error to assume so. 
 
3/ Democracy as a neoliberal fantasy  
The third weakness of the Green Democratic Transition platform concerns the status of 
democracy: it relies on democratization as a strategy of progressive politics. However, in the 
context of neoliberal capitalism the economization of society is so thorough that, as Wendy 
Brown observes, the demos itself has disintegrated into bits of human capital, while the 
state actively produces voters as economic actors. As people’s dependence on the health of 
global capitalism is translated into policy preferences through the rituals of democratic 
representation, democracy becomes a neoliberal fantasy; democracy is increasingly being 
deployed as a tool for perpetuating neoliberal capitalism.  
 
The strong capital-labour alliance against the Green transition, the narrow interpretation of 
social justice as countering inequality, and the erosion of the democratic foundation of 
politics combine to generate a condition I have called a ‘meta-crisis’ (crisis of the crisis) of 
democratic capitalism: even as the neoliberal hegemony has entered a crisis, transformation 
does not take place. Society is trapped in a state of inflammation and engaged in perpetual 
crisis-management. Is there a way out of this unfortunate conundrum? To reboot 




The social question of our time: the massification of precarity 
The outrage against inequality has been the rallying cry for the Left. However, this strategy, 
as the U.S. presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 revealed, has been based on a diagnostic 
error. Tellingly, the states where Trump made inroads among the working class (Alaska, 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Iowa, Utah, and Michigan), had seen the smallest increases in 
inequality nationwide since 1989, but their troubled economies have not generated good 
and stable employment. The Republican Party has been especially successful in Rust Belt 
states such as Michigan and Ohio, where poverty is not a result of skewed distribution of 
wealth, but of a broader industrial decay caused by automation and the offshoring of 
manufacturing to countries with cheaper labor, which has led to urban decay and rising 
criminality. 
As I have argued in Capitalism on Edge, a distinctive feature of current-day 
capitalism is the massification of economic and social insecurity –  a condition of ‘precarity 
for all’ that has been  politically induced. Four decades of ‘structural adjustment’ and 
‘austerity policy’ — reducing job security and slashing public spending on essential services, 
including health care – have dramatically weakened our societies and diminished their 
governing capacity. The combination of automation, globalization, and cuts in social 
provision has generated massive economic instability for ordinary citizens — for men and 
women, young and old, Black and white, skilled and unskilled, middle classes and the poor 
alike. This is becoming true also for the labour-market insiders (the envied ‘winners’ of 
globalization), as the competitive pressures of global capitalism are imposing a high price for 
their success: work-related stress, poor mental health, and a pathological work-life balance. 
The resulting precarity, more so than inequality, is what is ailing the 99 per cent. This is what 
has been fuelling right-wing populism beyond the ranks of the impoverished blue-collar 
working class (globalisation’s ‘losers’).  
It might be useful to remember that, while the rise of populism is usually a 
consequence of economic malaise and political turmoil (as in Nazi Germany of the 1930s), 
the most recent populist mobilizations emerged in the “roaring 1990s” -- in conditions of 
robust growth (except in Germany), rising living standards, and low unemployment. It was 
particularly spread in affluent and egalitarian societies such as France, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Finland, and Switzerland. The 1990s were the decade when the social consequences 
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of neoliberal globalisation began to be felt in terms of economic instability within, and 
despite, affluence.  
Thus, since the close of the twentieth century, a widespread anxiety in affluent 
Western societies emerged, based on perceptions that policies of open borders have 
brought in physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural estrangement, and employment 
insecurity due to employment flexibilization, job outsourcing, or loss of jobs to immigrants. 
These became the four ingredients of a new order-and-security public agenda that has 
dramatically reshaped the ideological landscape of liberal democracies. What has been 
mislabeled as “populism” are in fact mobilizations around this new public agenda of social 
concerns. 
A distinctive feature of populism is What Max Weber called “negative politics”— a 
hostile confrontation without a coherent programmatic stance and with no credible 
ambition to govern. However, the massification of economic insecurity brought about not 
just the negative politics of an anti-establishment protest (populism), it fostered the 
emergence of a substantive order-and-security agenda of public concerns. ‘Populist’ parties 
and movements are expressing a distinct set of public demands related to this order-and-
security agenda (from restrictive immigration policy to reforming trade agreements), and 
are persistently making their way into parliaments and governments.  
Precarity fosters conservative and even reactionary instincts. It nurtures an aversion 
to change, hence the shift to the right amidst the economic recession of 2008-2018, 
disappointing the Left’s expectations that the crisis would radicalise voters into an anti-
capitalist upheaval. Without significant reform of the political economy, without changes 
explicitly addressing the issue of economic precarity, our impassioned calls for a Green 
democratic transformation would be fruitless. For people to embrace the radical politics of a 
Green Democratic Transformation they first need to feel secure about their livelihoods. The 
challenge, therefore, is to build a more stable, secure, and sustainable society, by explicitly 
addressing the roots of precarity. The outdated and pernicious growth-and-redistribution 
idea of social justice should be replaced with a strategy for fighting economic insecurity. This 
will make the social justice agenda compatible with environmental justice – the only way to 
secure broad societal support for the Green New Deal we so urgently need. By appeasing 
the toxic anxieties that have been besetting our societies, the alleviation of precarity, in 
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turn, is likely to foster the solidaristic ethos that is needed for effective redistributive 
policies. 
This diagnosis of the social problem brings to light a path for radical progressive 
politics alternative to both the ‘class struggle’ formula of the old Left and the ‘Left populism’ 
formula of deepening democracy.  Because precarity is generated by the core dynamics of 
capitalism, namely the pursuit of profit, and because precarisation is afflicting all (including 
the purported ‘winners’ of neoliberal globalisation) there is an unprecedented opportunity 
for engaging a broad of alliance of forces in an anti-capitalist insurgency. Unglamorous 
policy reforms countering the competitive pursuit of profit (from social enterprises to 
universal and unconditional welfare) would amount to subverting capitalism without the 
crutches of a terminal crisis, a revolutionary break, or a guiding utopia.  
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